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Attila Tanyi 
The Case for Authority1 
1. The Overdemandingness Objection 
Consequentialism2 is the view that the right thing to do in any situa-
tion is the act with the best consequences as judged from an imper-
sonal point of view. Understood in this way consequentialism is a 
single-principle view; it is exhausted by what is called the optimiz-
ing principle of beneficence.3 Many disagree with this principle, 
however, emphasizing the significance of the personal in moral life. 
In this paper I discuss one particular objection: the claim that conse-
quentialism is overdemanding, hence unacceptable as an account of 
what we are morally required to do. Henry Sidgwick puts—but 
does not advocate—the point like this: 
                                           
1 This paper has been long in the making since it was first presented, in a 
form very different from the present one, at the Royal Holloway in 2001. 
I have accumulated many debts throughout the years. I would like to 
thank János Kis, Krister Bykvist, András Miklós, Hugh LaFolette as well 
as other friends, colleagues and audiences in Lisbon, Dundee, Oxford, 
Stockholm, Oslo and Budapest. While writing, revising, and redrafting 
the paper I have been supported by a Guest Scholarship from the Swe-
dish Institute, a Postdoctoral Fellowship of the Swedish Research Coun-
cil (Grant number: 435-2007-7830), the Hungarian State Eötvös Fellow-
ship, and a Fellowship from the Zukunftskolleg at the University of 
Konstanz. 
2 By “consequentialism” I have in mind what is normally called act-
consequentialism. I have removed the qualifier because in what follows I 
will not be interested in other forms of consequentialism, some of which 
were born in response to OD (in particular, as instances of the restructur-
ing strategy mentioned below). 
3 In this paper I disregard the distinction between utilitarianism and con-
sequentialism. The two can differ either because on consequentialism the 
goodness of consequences need not solely be a function of human well-
being, or because utilitarianism need not require the impersonal promo-
tion of aggregate well-being. The former difference does not influence 
the upcoming discussion, while non-consequentialist utilitarians are not 
subject to the Overdemandingness Objection. Hence my equivocation in 
the text. 
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Indeed, from a practical point of view the principle of aiming 
at the “greatest happiness of the greatest number” is prima 
facie more definitely opposed to Egoism than the Common-
Sense Morality is. For this latter seems to leave a man free to 
pursue his own happiness under certain definite limits and 
conditions: whereas Utilitarianism seems to require a more 
comprehensive and unceasing subordination of self-interest 
to the common good. And thus, as Mill remarks, Utilitarian-
ism is sometimes attacked from two precisely sides: from a 
confusion with Egoistic Hedonism it is called base and 
groveling; while at the same time it is more plausibly 
charged with setting up too high a standard of unselfishness 
and making exaggerated demands on human nature.4 
Let us call the last charge Sidgwick mentions the Overdemandingness 
Objection (OD). As the quote from Sidgwick also shows, OD has had 
a long a history.5 This paper is an attempt to assess its significance as 
a challenge to consequentialism. 
OD is built on two pillars. One is the idea that consequentialism is 
extremely demanding. Two simple considerations show this. First, 
the optimizing principle requires the agent to do what is best over-
all, that is, to promote the good until the point where further efforts 
would burden her as much as they would benefit others. Second, the 
situation that determines what would be best overall is far from 
ideal. Just to mention few things, today’s world involves mass po-
verty both in the agent’s own country (with few exceptions) and in 
the world as a whole; the number of people who donate money to 
charity is very low; and the political institutions that might make 
things better are not too efficient especially on the international lev-
el. Hence it seems that if one takes seriously consequentialism, one 
must devote much of one’s financial resources, energy and leisure 
time to charity work.6 At the same time, most of us have a firmly 
held belief that this cannot be right, that people should not be re-
quired to sacrifice their life on the altar of morality. This is the 
second pillar of OD. For this belief seems to ground an intuitive 
constraint on admissible moral theories requiring them to avoid un-
                                           
4 Sidgwick (1907): 87. 
5 For references see Hooker (2009): 162 footnote 4, Carter (2009). 
6 In fact, even if the demands themselves are not extreme, the iteration of 
such requirements may easily add up to altogether extreme demands 
(Cullity (2004): Chapter 1). 
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acceptable demands. If they do not, we think, these theories should 
not be allowed to guide our conduct. OD is an attempt to articulate 
this constraint. 
Let me put this more formally by spelling out the structure of OD in 
more detail. This will help us to put things in context. Here is the 
structure:7 
(1) Consequentialism makes demand D.  
(2) Demand D is intuitively unacceptable. 
(3) Therefore, consequentialism makes intuitively unaccept-
able demands.  
(4) If a moral theory makes unacceptable demands, then we 
have reason to reject it. 
(5) Therefore, we have reason to reject consequentialism. 
This more detailed structure well illustrates the possible ways of 
tackling OD. The strategy of “denial” rejects premise (1) either be-
cause it holds that the premise rests on false empirical facts, or be-
cause it argues that the internal structure of consequentialism is 
such that it does not make the demand.8 The strategy of “extrem-
ism” rejects premise (4) by trying to undermine or discredit the in-
tuitions that underlie the premise,9 or by pointing out that other 
moral theories also fall prey to OD, thus they are all “companions in 
guilt”.10 Although it is logically possible to reject premise (2), this is 
a move that is rarely (if ever) appealed to in the literature. This is for 
good reason: it is hard to deny that the intuition exists. This leaves 
us with the strategy of denial and the strategy of extremism. I disre-
gard the idea of rejecting the empirical basis of OD because I think 
these arguments do not succeed.11 I also set aside the other version 
of the strategy of denial because I think this discussion has become 
increasingly cumbersome and hard to follow, thus to discuss it with-
in the constraints of a single paper would be a futile enterprise. 
                                           
7 Mulgan (2001): 25. 
8 Cullity (2004), (2009), Hooker (2000), Murphy (2000), Mulgan (2001), 
Scheffler (1994), Slote (1984). 
9 Singer (1972), Kagan (1989), Unger (1996), Tännsjö (2002), Sobel (2007). 
10 Mulgan (2007): 103-104. 
11 Ibid: 31-37. 
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Instead, I will side with the strategy extremism, but provide an ap-
proach to OD different from its advocates. My idea is that once we 
have a careful analysis of OD at hand, we will see that all the possi-
ble interpretations have serious problems. To show this, I will first 
spell out the three dimensions of moral demands along which one 
can interpret OD: those based on its scope, content, and authority 
respectively. This will not only provide us with a clear view of the 
different ways of advocating OD, but will also make it possible for 
us to see the shortcomings of these interpretations. In particular, I 
will argue that of the three possible interpretations of OD only one, 
the version based on the authority of consequentialism, is viable, but 
this one too has its (serious) problems. The case for authority, there-
by the support for OD is thus weak, if there is any at all. 
2. The three dimensions: scope, content, authority 
The first dimension is also the most straightforward one. It concerns 
the scope of moral demands, that is to say, the circle of voluntary 
human action that the moral theory making the demand regards as 
open to moral assessment. This does not mean that only human ac-
tion is subject to moral appraisal. Nor is it to claim that there are no 
differences in the degrees of sophistication concerning the moral as-
sessment one applies to different cases. And it is certainly not to say 
that there are not instances when one does not or, in fact, should not 
engage in the activity of moral appraisal. In certain situations of hu-
man life it is just not healthy, or appropriate, or humanly supporta-
ble, or desirable to engage in such assessment.12 With these excusing 
conditions in mind, we can say that a moral theory counts as over-
demanding with respect to the dimension of scope if the circle of ac-
tions open to moral assessment is too broad. And we can add that 
moral theories, which adhere to this claim are pervasive: they assess 
(almost) every element of our life, (almost) every action we take. 
The next variable that enters claims of overdemandingness concerns 
the content of moral demands. On the face of it, the idea is simple. 
Every moral theory involves certain directives that determine what 
the agent should do in the given situation. If these directives are 
such that obeying them would be seriously inconsistent with the 
agent’s non-moral goals, projects and commitments, then the given 
moral theory would qualify as overdemanding with respect to its 
                                           
12 Scheffler (1992): 25. 
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content. Observe that this dimension is different from the previous 
one. We can see this best if we take a moral theory that is normally 
regarded as less demanding: charity. On this view nothing is re-
quired of moral agents; all acts of beneficence are supererogatory. 
Yet, theories of charity are pervasive. What they say is not that cer-
tain voluntary human actions are exempt from moral assessment, 
but that the result of such evaluation is unfavorable from the moral 
perspective: one is permitted to pursue one’s non-moral goals. And 
being permitted shows the presence of moral assessment, not the 
absence of it. 
However, unlike scope, this dimension requires further interpretati-
on. In particular, we have to clarify three issues: what it is that moral 
directives are inconsistent with; how we understand inconsistency; 
and how we measure it. To answer the first question we must find a 
notion that captures the idea that the agent has goals and projects 
that can conflict with moral directives. The notion that best serves 
this purpose is the notion of the agent’s well-being. To avoid ruling 
out the conflict between the agent’s well-being and morality a priori, 
we must assume that neither is defined in terms of the other. In this 
paper I am going to build on this assumption.13 I take it that this 
internal connection is far from being intuitively supported, thus fur-
ther argument is needed to prove its existence.14 Also, reference to 
well-being brings in the question of which account of well-being one 
adheres to. This is, however, another issue that I set aside in the pa-
per. Given the present situation in the world, it does not matter 
what account of well-being we advocate. This does not mean that 
theories of well-being are not important elsewhere; it is only to say 
that they do not play a significant role in discussions about OD. 
                                           
13 This is consistent with consequentialism’s insistence to analyse rightness 
in terms of goodness since the goodness it refers to is impersonal. Hence 
to achieve the required congruence, one would have to show that there is 
a conceptual relation between impersonal and personal goodness, which 
is just another substantial, intuitively not supported position.  
14 For an early consequentialist discussion see Sidgwick (1907): Concluding 
Chapter. More recently, Nagel (1986: 197) and Scheffler (1992: chapter 7) 
have both ruled out the existence of a conceptual connection. It must be 
noted that Scheffler does not deny that there can be a congruence be-
tween the agent’s well-being and morality; what he rejects is the idea that 
such a connection is conceptual as opposed to, say, empirical and thus 
contingent. Rawls (1971: chapter IX) agrees and argues for congruence. 
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The second issue concerns our understanding of inconsistency. To 
get a grip on this notion, we need to clarify another notion: that of a 
“demand”. Liam Murphy suggests two competing readings. In a 
broad sense of the word a “demand” just refers to a “requirement”: 
anything that a given moral theory requires one to do counts as a 
demand of that theory. In a narrow sense of the word only certain 
requirements of a moral theory qualify as demands: those that in-
volve losses and thus are costly to the agent.15 Accordingly, the 
broad reading interprets inconsistency as the simple claim that mo-
rality involves requirements that can conflict with the agent’s well-
being. The narrow reading takes the same route, but adds to it that 
relevant conflicts also reduce the agent’s well-being. Although the 
typical approach in the literature follows the narrow reading, the 
broad reading sounds more plausible with regard to deontic con-
straints against killing or stealing. For though we can say that a 
moral theory should impose, in the form of these constraints, certain 
costs on the agent, it seems more natural to claim that it should not 
involve certain requirements.16 Although one may try to collapse the 
broad reading into the narrow one, I think it is best to set these read-
ings apart until further argument is provided to the contrary. 
When some understanding of the notion of well-being and demand 
is in place, we can proceed to the clarification of the third issue: how 
to assess demands. This requires a baseline relative to which we 
qualify requirements (broad reading) or assess losses (narrow read-
ing). There are two types of baselines, non-normative and norma-
tive.17 The former draws a line that is empirically understood. A 
good example is the idea that the baseline is given by the factual sta-
tus quo: how things are and how we expect them to be. If we use 
this baseline, then a moral directive that, say, makes us give up 
                                           
15 Murphy (2000): 17. Some philosophers argue that in addition to costs one 
should also consider the factor Scheffler (1992: 98) calls “confinement”. In 
his formulation a moral theory is confining to the extent the constraints it 
involves narrow the range of morally acceptable courses of action open 
to the agent. It is, however, questionable whether confinement indeed 
constitutes an independent factor. Murphy (2000: 29-30), for instance, ar-
gues that a large part of confinement can be explained as losses that the 
agent suffers in her well-being when obeying with moral dictates. There-
fore, given its controversial nature and the fact that I will not need it in 
the upcoming discussion, I do not deal with confinement in detail. 
16 Hurley (2003): 847-848. 
17 Murphy (2000): 35-36, Hurley (2003): 846-847. 
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something dear to us that we otherwise expect to have in the future 
will pose a requirement that it should not (broad reading), and will 
impose a loss on us that it should not (narrow reading). A normative 
baseline, on the other hand, may for instance set entitlements and 
compare demands to them. Hence, if we suppose that we are en-
titled to our material possessions, constraints against stealing would 
be requirements that a moral theory should have (broad reading), 
and would be losses a moral theory should impose on the agent 
(narrow reading). 
With these three notions at hand we can now define when a moral 
theory is overdemanding with respect to its content. We can say one 
of two things. Either a moral theory is overdemanding if it contains 
requirements that we think it should not; this follows the broad 
reading of demand. Alternatively, we can say that a moral theory is 
overdemanding if it imposes costs on the agent that we find unac-
ceptable; this follows the narrow reading. As shown above, both in-
terpretations require an account of the agent’s well-being as well a 
properly set baseline. We can call moral theories that fall into either 
of these categories stringent: they are theories that require the agent 
to give up most of her goals, projects, and commitments in order to 
act morally. 
Both the dimension of scope and the dimension of content focus ex-
clusively on the moral side and regard the non-moral as passive. 
However, in real life there is a battle going on and this battle is 
fought with reasons.18 Whenever we act in a situation where moral 
options are also present—and if one follows a consequentialist mo-
rality the number of such situations is high—we have to decide 
among competing reasons for action. This suggests a further dimen-
sion that I am going to call authority. With the new dimension comes 
another understanding of overdemandingness. It stems from what 
is often called the Overridingness Thesis (OT): the idea that moral 
reasons override other conflicting reasons of the agent. The thesis 
has a weak and a strong form depending on whether reasons to act 
as morality requires always win out in the clash of reasons (strong 
version), or only sometimes, albeit, perhaps, most of the time (weak 
version). For reasons to be explained later, the weak reading is 
                                           
18 Perhaps the dimension of authority is not exhausted by reasons, howev-
er. For example, Broome (2000, 2004) argues for the existence of what he 
calls “normative requirements”. For more on this see Broome (2007), Ko-
lodni (2005), Scanlon (2007). 
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enough to support OD. It is important, moreover, not to confuse this 
dimension with the previous two. The present interpretation is 
about overall normative verdicts; it is about what the agent on the 
whole ought to do. In contrast with this, the dimension of scope 
deals with the object of those verdicts, whereas the dimension of 
content concerns the content of the reasons that enter those verdicts. 
This dimension also requires interpretation. In order to have a clear 
view of what in this sense an overriding moral theory consists in we 
need to clarify the notion of a moral reason. To this purpose, it is 
best to use Thomas Nagel’s distinction between agent-relative and 
agent-neutral reasons.19 The latter involve essential, that is to say, 
ineliminable reference to the agent who has the reason, whereas the 
former do not. Pain and pleasure, according to Nagel, are typical 
agent-neutral reasons since it makes no difference who has them: 
they ground reasons regardless of who their holder is since it does 
not matter whose pain or pleasure we are dealing with.20 As to agent-
relative reasons, Nagel distinguishes three types of agent-
relativity.21 There are reasons of autonomy that are provided by the 
agent’s projects and goals (it matters that they are my goals); reasons 
of special obligations that are based on the agent’s obligations to 
those who are closely related (it matters that they are my loved 
ones); and deontological reasons that are grounded in the claims of 
other people not to be maltreated in certain ways (it matters that it is 
me who commits the murder). 
Put in this framework, the reasons consequentialism provides are 
agent-neutral: to do what produces the best consequences overall is 
a reason that is not indexed to any particular agent.22 Other moral 
theories take morality to be more agent-relative. A good example is 
Kantian deontology, which identifies moral reasons with Nagel’s 
deontological reasons, but contractualism and virtue theory may al-
so be cited here. Similarly to the dimension of content, there is a ca-
veat here, too. To avoid ruling out the conflict between moral and 
non-moral reasons a priori, I again assume that there is no concep-
tual connection between the two. To prove this kind of internal rela-
tion is another substantial position, which requires further support. 
                                           
19 Nagel (1986): 164-166, Ridge (2005). 
20 Nagel (1986): 164-165. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid: 164. 
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Moral reasons are also normative practical reasons; hence this latter 
notion too needs to be clarified. Given the confines of this paper, any 
attempt for clarification will be severely limited; yet, there is space 
to introduce some important distinctions and interpretations. 
Recently there has been an upsurge in the literature in this regard, 
so I will only highlight the main points here. The most widely 
shared view is that a reason is a consideration that speaks in favor of 
action.23 In other words, a reason is a fact that stands in a normative 
relation—we can call it favoring or reason-relation—to action. 
Reasons understood in this way are pro tanto considerations: they 
have a certain weight and when we decide what to do overall what 
we do is weighing them against each other. Jonathan Dancy’s notion 
of contributory reason sums up the idea well. He says: “A contribu-
tory reason for action is a feature whose presence makes something 
of a case for acting, but in such a way that the overall case for doing 
that action can be improved or strengthened by the addition of a 
second feature playing a similar role”.24 
Reasons, however, can do other things than outweigh or be out-
weighed by other reasons and this additional ability is important for 
a proper understanding of authority. Here are two examples for the 
“alternative” behavior of reasons. According to Joseph Raz, in the 
sphere of legal practice there exists what he calls exclusionary rea-
sons.25 The reasons that law provides do not merely outweigh op-
posing considerations but also exclude them: they say that rival con-
siderations simply do not qualify as reasons in the given situation. 
Thomas Scanlon notes a similar phenomenon with respect to rea-
sons for action. He says that certain reasons, typically those that 
come with some role of the agent, silence other considerations by 
urging that the agent should not attach any weight to them.26 
The two abilities we attributed to reasons single out two rival un-
derstandings of OT. The first is the idea that moral reasons outweigh 
non-moral reasons. This is the typical understanding of overriding-
ness in the literature.27 The other ability of reasons, however, sug-
gests an alternative picture on which moral reasons silence non-
                                           
23 Raz (1975): 186, Gibbard (1990): 163, Scanlon (1998): 17, Dancy (2004): 33. 
24 Dancy (2004): 15. 
25 Raz (1975): 73-76, 185-186. 
26 Scanlon (1998): 51-53. 
27 Scheffler (1992): Chapter 4, Nagel (1986): Chapter 10. 
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moral reasons: they urge that we attach no weight to them disre-
garding them as reasons. John McDowell is the primary representa-
tive of this position.28 In his interpretation the virtuous person is not 
someone who overcomes non-virtuous inclinations because this is 
what the balance of reasons requires; instead, she is someone who 
does not consider those inclinations as reasons at all. They just do 
not appear on her “normative horizon”, they do not count norma-
tively. 
Given these two readings of OT, we get two corresponding interpre-
tations of OD with regard to the dimension of authority. The claim 
is that a moral theory is overdemanding because our reasons to 
meet its requirements, at least according to the theory, override—
meaning: outweigh or silence—other competing reasons, resulting 
in situations when it demands us, with alleged decisive force, to do 
things that we do not have decisive reason to do.29 To put it shortly, 
a moral theory in this case is unreasonably demanding because it is 
inescapable: it is a theory whose directives are (most of the time) not 
overruled by other, non-moral considerations. 
As mentioned before, OD thus understood does not need more than 
the weak form of OT. Now we can see why this is so. OD in its 
present form is based on the idea that at least in some situations 
what a moral theory requires us to do is such that, intuitively, we do 
not have decisive reason to do it. Situations in which this is the case 
can come about even if moral reasons do not always override non-
moral reasons. Surely, we are more likely to encounter such cases if 
the stronger claim is true, but this is not needed. Moreover, it is 
more charitable to advocates of OD to proceed on the assumption 
that the weak version is enough to support the objection. 
These are then, the three dimensions of moral demands and the cor-
responding interpretations of OD. It is important to keep them apart 
because the dimension one focuses on will determine the form OD 
takes in one’s hands. Yet, the three dimensions are often not distin-
guished from each other. Bernard Williams offers a good example. 
In objecting to consequentialism he seems to oscillate between three 
                                           
28 McDowell (1978): 26-29, (1979): 335. 
29 I do not mean to introduce any new reason-relation by invoking the con-
cept of a decisive reason. As I understand it, what we have decisive rea-
son to do is just what we have most reason to do. 
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options.30 One is that there are certain fields of our life such as per-
sonal relationships that should be immune to criticism: they should 
lie beyond moral justification. This is a claim about the scope of mo-
rality. The other is that morality should not require agents to aban-
don their ground projects, goals that constitute their character. This 
is a claim about the content of morality. Furthermore, his wording of 
OD might also be taken to be a claim about authority: morality 
should not be too demanding in the sense that its reasons override 
all non-moral reasons, including those based on one’s ground 
projects.31 
He is not alone with this confusion. Peter Railton is similarly unclear 
as to which dimension he has in mind when he formulates OD,32 as 
is Susan Wolf indecisive when she argues for the undesirability of 
moral saints.33 There are exceptions, though. Samuel Scheffler dis-
tinguishes different ways of understanding OD and the different 
dimensions and corresponding interpretations of OD appear in the 
more recent work of Sobel and Hurley as well.34 
Keeping the three dimensions separate also makes visible their dif-
ferent combinations. Thus it is possible to claim that no human ac-
tion is absent from moral assessment and still hold that certain mor-
al requirements, such as giving up one’s ground projects, are not 
part of the content of morality. One can also argue that not only the 
scope of moral justification is unrestricted but also its content. Mo-
rality can demand anything, including the most financially and oth-
erwise burdensome actions, provided the reasons it gives rise to, do 
not override the agent’s other, non-moral considerations. Finally, as 
a third option morality can require that we should all be moral 
saints (although, admittedly, this would also require certain motiva-
tional assumptions); in this case, neither its scope, nor its content, 
nor its authority are restricted. OD can be taken to be based on these 
combinations of the different dimensions and articulate a constraint 
on moral theories accordingly. 
In the remainder of the paper my primary occupation will be to see 
which dimension, alone or in combination with others, is best suited 
                                           
30 Williams (1973a), (1973b), (1981a), (1981b). 
31 Williams (1981a). 
32 Railton (1984): 141, 147. 
33 Wolf (1982): 420-422, 433-438. 
34 Scheffler (1992): chapter 2, Sobel (2007), Hurley (2006). 
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for maintaining the challenge of OD as applied to consequential-
ism.35 First, I will argue that focusing on the dimension of scope 
would be a mistaken move. There is no problem with the pervasive-
ness of consequentialism, constraining its scope is neither helpful, 
nor is it justified. And though recent approaches interpret OD as a 
claim about the excessively demanding content of consequentialism, 
I will argue that constraining the content of consequentialism is also 
unjustified. This then forces advocates to put OD in terms of the di-
mension of authority. But I will argue that defending this interpreta-
tion of OD is at best an open-ended and perilous enterprise. From 
this I conclude that although from the point of view of advocates of 
OD there is a strong case for the authority-based reading of OD, 
there is an equally strong case for being skeptical about this reading. 
The case for authority and, thus, for the case for OD, if there is any, 
is weak. 
3. The (very) strong case against scope and content  
Let us begin with the dimension of scope and the corresponding 
claim that consequentialism is overdemanding because it is perva-
sive. There are three reasons why one should not accept this as an 
adequate reading of OD. 
First, reducing the scope of consequentialism would not be enough 
to avoid OD, and this suggests that pervasiveness cannot itself 
ground an overdemandingness challenge to consequentialism. Im-
agine the resulting theory. It would be a version of consequentialism 
that exempts certain areas of life, probably those most important for 
the agent (e.g. Williams’ ground projects) and/or the most trivial 
ones (e.g. brushing my teeth in the bathroom), while leaving the rest 
of the agent’s goals and projects open to moral assessment. As a re-
sult in those areas the “new” consequentialism would still be de-
manding: it would still require that the agent give up those goals and 
projects, and would do so with overriding force. Of course, there is 
fair amount of discretion involved here; yet, reducing the scope of 
                                           
35 In the present section I have deliberately focused on general interpreta-
tions of OD that make no reference to any particular moral theory. It is it-
self a question whether OD only applies to consequentialism, or other 
moral theories can also be objected to in this way. See Mulgan (2007): 
Chapter 5 for the claim that the appeal of OD is universal, Ashford (2003) 
for a criticism of Scanlon’s contractualism on these grounds, and some of 
the essays of Chappell (2009) on OD and virtue theory, basic rights etc. 
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consequentialism still leaves the bulk of one’s life expendable for 
moral purposes. If there is a problem with pervasiveness, then this 
problem arises from its combination with stringency and/or inesca-
pability; pervasiveness alone is not sufficient to support OD. 
If this objection is not convincing enough, here is another one. It is 
difficult to find a rationale of why the pervasiveness of consequen-
tialism would make it objectionable on grounds of overdemanding-
ness. Even if people do believe that there is something wrong with a 
pervasive moral theory (an assumption that I think is also open to 
doubt), it is difficult to find any ground for their belief. There is one 
supporting consideration that comes to mind, but that does not de-
liver the goods: Williams’ alienation charge.36 With significant sim-
plification, Williams’ point is that consequentialism alienates the 
agent from her commitments, goals and relationships by making her 
pursuit of them contingent on the impersonal thought that they are 
morally permitted. That is, the theory claims that the “motivating 
thought” of the agent, “fully spelled out” is that it is morally per-
missible or required to do the particular act. And it seems that the 
reason why Williams says this is the unrestricted scope of conse-
quentialism. Since all voluntary human action is open to moral as-
sessment, the agent’s motivating thought will always include the 
permissibility or requiredness of her act.37 
However, there need to be no such direct connection between Wil-
liams’ charge and the pervasiveness of consequentialism. To begin 
with, there are some minor discrepancies. Williams’ point is 
completely general, it is about how the agent should not relate to 
any of her goals, commitments and relationships; whereas OD 
understood in terms of scope is restricted to some of the agent’s 
goals, commitments and relationships, presumably the most trivial 
and most important ones. Also, the alienation charge works best if 
one supposes that the moral motive is not only one among many 
other motives of the agent but is also the primary, dominant one, 
while this certainly does not follow from OD as based on scope. But 
the important difference is that the alienation charge is about the 
agent’s motivating thought, whereas OD is about the moral 
assessment of human action. Such assessment need not presuppose 
that the agent has any thought about the moral permissibility of her 
                                           
36 Williams (1973a), (1973b). See also Stocker (1976), Wolf (1982). 
37 Scheffler (1992): 21. 
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action.38 It is perfectly compatible, for instance, with indirect (or, in 
its special Harean form, two-level) consequentialism that takes 
consequentialism to be giving us a criterion of rightness and saying 
nothing about the agent’s thinking to this effect. Although this 
theory would avoid the charge of alienation, it would be still liable 
to OD since it assesses all human action according to the consequen-
tialist criterion of rightness.39 Hence, the alienation charge cannot be 
the rationale for OD since it is different from it. 
The third reason in its nature is similar to the first. Samuel Scheffler 
has argued forcefully that moral assessment is always context-
dependent, hence it is simply false to distinguish between cases that 
are open to assessment and those that are not.40 We can illustrate 
this with examples. Although brushing my teeth in the bathroom 
appears to be trivial enough to escape moral assessment, this ap-
pearance quickly disappears once one considers a different descrip-
tion of the situation, when, say, in the other room someone is about 
to kill my girlfriend. Williams’ example describes a case in which 
the stakes are high. We are to imagine a husband who has to choose 
between saving his wife and saving a complete stranger. Here, Wil-
liams points out, the agent’s choice to save his wife “certainly lies 
beyond justification”.41 This sounds convincing but only until we 
reconsider the situation under a different description. For instance, 
we can add that the man’s wife is a dangerous serial killer, while the 
other person is the only man who knows how to cure cancer effec-
tively. When we do this, our reaction to the situation changes. Now 
it is not self-evident that the husband’s action “lies beyond justifica-
tion”. No action, it seems, is immune to moral justification; it is not 
only that we cannot tackle OD on the basis of scope: we should not do 
so. Hence pervasiveness cannot be the (only) ground for OD be-
cause it is in fact a desirable feature of moral theories. 
                                           
38 There is, moreover, good reason to suppose that Williams’ alienation 
charge collapses even without endorsing two-level consequentialism as 
do Sidgwick ((1907): 413), Railton (1984), Herman (1983), (1991). For 
proof of this claim building on a psychologically more sophisticated pic-
ture of the agent’s practical thinking see Scheffler (1992): 31-32, Raz 
(1999): 114-116, Scanlon (1998): 24. 
39 Railton (1984): 161. 
40 Scheffler (1992): 24-25. 
41 Williams (1981a): 18. 
 173 
Turn now to the content-based reading of OD. It is this dimension 
along which OD was typically understood and has attracted the 
most influential responses: this is the most often advocated form of 
the strategy of denial mentioned in the first section. Representatives 
of this position in one way or another all have argued that the inter-
nal structure of consequentialism is such that it does not make the 
excessive demands attributed to it. As I said earlier, I will not deal 
with these responses. Instead, I will consider two arguments that 
question the idea that the content-based reading of OD is the right 
one to proceed with in the first place. The first was recently made by 
Paul Hurley:42 the problem with the content-based interpretation is 
that a moral requirement only transforms into a moral demand, if 
there are reasons supporting the requirement. Hence an overde-
manding content is objectionable only if it is backed by reasons, 
which is not something this reading of OD has anything to say 
about. Therefore, just like pervasiveness, stringency alone cannot 
give us an overdemandingness challenge. And since pervasiveness 
is not a problematic aspect of consequentialism, the two together are 
also harmless to consequentialism. The only important dimension 
for OD is inescapability; it is this alleged feature of consequentialism 
that the fate of OD ultimately turns on. 
Two related points are in place. The first is Hurley’s own.43 Conse-
quentialists, he says, should not be happy to endorse this response 
since consequentialism has no theory of reasons; hence, it may not, 
properly speaking, make demands on people. However, while this 
is true, it does not mean that consequentialism cannot be augmented 
by a theory of reasons. Although Hurley is skeptical about this pos-
sibility,44 it is nevertheless a viable theoretical option. In that case, 
the next challenge that follows from the side of advocates of OD is 
that consequentialism is committed to OT; but this again is a sub-
stantial thesis to be proven right. I will say more about this issue in 
the following section. 
Second, in his response to Hurley, David Sobel points out that Hur-
ley must provide arguments for his claim that only reason-backed 
content matters.45 However, Sobel does not consider an obvious re-
                                           
42 Hurley (2006): 690-691, 725. 
43 Ibid: 683, 685-686. 
44 Ibid: 698-704. 
45 Sobel (2007): 15-16. 
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ply: as moral demands are supposed to be action-guiding and if the 
normative is all about reasons as many claim,46 it is hard to see what 
relevance and significance moral demands that lack the support of 
reasons would have. No doubt, Sobel is right in that we can mea-
ningfully discuss the demands of consequentialism without refer-
ence to the reasons it provides. However, to base an objection of the 
style of OD on this discussion, we need to show why this discussion 
is relevant for our conduct.47 And this is where reasons appear as es-
sential ingredients. 
There is another, perhaps less controversial objection to the content-
based version of OD, this time coming from Sobel himself. His idea 
is that the stringency of consequentialism, just like its pervasiveness 
is not objectionable: no good rationale can be found for objecting to 
it. Unlike advocates of the strategy of extremism, Sobel, however, 
does not want to refute the offered content-based rationales for OD. 
Instead, his main point is that there is a way to support OD, but this 
support presupposes “prior and independent breaks with conse-
quentialism”, that is, prior to and independent of issues of deman-
dingness.48 This break concerns the distinction between the costs a 
moral theory requires the agent to bear and the costs a moral theory 
permits to befall on agents as a result of not requiring others to pre-
vent it.49 OD, understood along the dimension of content, Sobel ar-
gues, only focuses on costs a moral theory requires to bear, and to-
tally disregards the costs a moral theory permits; this is why it says 
that consequentialism is overdemanding. However, this distinction 
and the resulting choice presupposes that we already know some-
thing about “the true shape of morality” before we employ OD. That 
is, when we are concerned with OD what we are concerned with is 
not excessive demands, but something else that our complaints only 
                                           
46 For instance, Dancy (2004), Scanlon (1998), Schroeder (2007). 
47 Note that this view does not presuppose that morality is somehow 
transparent to its followers, as Rawls ((1971): 182) and Williams ((1973a): 
128) demand it to be the case. Reasons may not be available to their pos-
sessors, and consequentialism may indeed only give us a criterion of 
rightness without saying anything about decision-making procedures. 
All that is claimed is that morality is action-guiding in the sense that it is 
normative, i.e., that it provides us with reasons (cf. Sobel (2001a), 
(2001b)). 
48 Sobel (2007): 1, 3. 
49 Ibid: 3, 5. 
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track, namely the distinction between the two kinds of costs.50 And 
though there appear to be ways of supporting this distinction that 
claim not to jeopardize OD, none of them works out.51 
4. Consequentialism and common-sense morality 
These considerations lead me to the conclusion that those who ad-
vocate OD should follow the authority dimension. Their claim 
should be that consequentialism is overdemanding because, while 
being stringent and pervasive, our reasons to meet its requirements 
override other competing reasons, resulting in situations when it 
demands us, with alleged decisive force, to do things that we do not 
have decisive reason to do. This reading is not subject to any of the 
points made against the other two interpretations of OD. There is 
thus a case for authority, but how strong is it? Rather weak, I think. 
To begin with, as noted earlier, consequentualism, unlike Kantian or 
Hobbesian moral theories, is a theory of moral standards that has 
nothing to say about moral reasons: it must be augmented by a sep-
arate theory of reasons. Hence, we cannot simply refer to the theo-
retical construct called “consequentialism” to see if advocates of OD 
are right when they make or, rather, when we imagine them to 
make claims about OT, thus about the inescapability of consequen-
tialist directives. There is no evidence that consequentualists typical-
ly endorse such a claim, much less that they need to do so.52 
However, let us suppose that consequentialists do want to endorse 
OT. This only creates further problems for the present approach. 
                                           
50 Ibid: 7-8. 
51 Ibid: 6, 8, 10-14. One of these is to rely on linguistic intuitions as to what a 
moral “demand” consists in: that it is identical with a moral requirement. 
My earlier interpretation of “demand” may suggest this response. How-
ever, Sobel (2007: 8-9) argues that even if we accept this understanding of 
“demand”, it will still be the case that we need to vindicate the distinc-
tion between requiring and permitting costs. Otherwise, he points out, 
we sap the strength of OD by relying on a reading of moral demand that 
may turn out to be normatively unimportant. 
52 In fact, it is possible for the consequentialist to avoid OD in the way we 
understand it now, by refusing to say anything about moral reasons for 
action. I do not, however, consider this possibility. This move is not only 
charitable to advocates of OD but is also in line with Hurley’s aforemen-
tioned argument since that stresses the importance of reasons for a moral 
theory. 
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First, many regard OT as itself part of common sense (or folk) mo-
rality. Sarah Stroud, for instance, argues for this claim at length,53 
and Hurley takes it for granted.54 But then, with pervasiveness and 
content discredited for diverse reasons as grounds of OD, it becomes 
a question whether we get anywhere with the present reading of 
OD. How can OT, on its own, lead to a constraint on moral theories, 
which OD is taken to articulate, if it is itself part of common sense 
morality, that is, if it is itself something common sense morality has 
no problem with? We cannot say that, intuitively, there is a problem 
with an overriding consequentialist theory because it demands us, 
with decisive force, to do things we have no decisive reason to do, 
when we at the same time think that a moral theory with (inclusive-
ly or exclusively) consequentialist content should be overriding. 
Two responses can be made. Either one can argue that the empirical 
claims concerning the embeddedness of OT in our every-day prac-
tice do not bring to surface any pre-theoretical intuitions: OT, con-
trary to appearance, is not part of common-sense morality. Howev-
er, this is at best an open-ended inquiry. Alternatively, one can point 
out that even if OT is part of common-sense morality, together with 
the excessive content of consequentualism and its pervasiveness, it 
does produce OD. This may be true, were it not for the considera-
tions mentioned in the previous section. For if pervasiveness is a de-
sirable feature of moral theories, and the problem with the excessive 
content of consequentialism is not that it is excessive but something 
else, OD will not follow. We will have inescapability that is part of 
common sense morality, we will have pervasiveness, which is desir-
able, and we will have excessive content, which is not problematic 
just in virtue of the fact that it is excessive. There is no way one can 
derive an intuitive constraint on moral theories based on the over-
demandingness of those theories from these three elements. Yet, this 
is just what OD is supposed to be. 
There is, second, the question of how consequentialists would prove 
that consequentialist morality is inescapable. As both Hurley and 
Stroud points out, one way for consequentialism to do this would be 
by appeal to the content of common sense morality. But, as we saw 
above, this may cause problems for this reading of OD, instead of 
helping its case. Besides, as both authors show, consequentialism 
                                           
53 Stroud (1998): 176-177. 
54 Hurley (2006): 691. 
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cannot make such an appeal.55 There are two main reasons for this 
that are also related. The first is that the reason why common sense 
morality endorses OT is that it takes the content of moral demands 
to be moderate involving both permissions to pursue one’s personal 
projects as well as restrictions concerning what we can do to others 
(deontic duties, typically). This is so, moreover, because the moral 
weight common sense morality attributes to the agent’s well-being 
is out of proportion to the weight it has from an impartial stand-
point, which is just what consequentialism attributes to it. Of course, 
consequentialism may be so configured that it becomes as moderate 
as common sense morality is with regard to its content.56 But then 
the charge of OD would no longer stick: we would have a moderate 
moral theory that is inescapable but not overdemanding. This is just 
what some advocates of the strategy of denial claim to have 
achieved in response to OD. Hence this reading would no longer be 
a version of OD: it would not be OD at all. 
Let me summarize these points. The existing content of common-
sense morality has a direct effect on the normative issue of which 
moral theory to accept. Based on the previous discussion, we can 
distinguish three options for consequentialism with respect to the 
content of common-sense morality. All options, let me add, presup-
pose that we have a fairly good picture of common-sense morality at 
hand, which is far from the case.57 Most probably, to acquire such an 
account we would need to probe common-sense morality with ex-
perimental means such as surveys, questionnaires, and so on. But 
setting aside this difficulty for the moment, the three scenarios are 
the following: 
(1) OT turns out to be part of common sense morality with, 
inclusively or exclusively, consequentialist content (i.e. 
the optimizing principle of beneficence). 
                                           
55 Stroud (1998): 179-184, Hurley (2006): 691-693. 
56 Scheffler’s (1992: 57-60) argument against a certain strategy to show that 
morality cannot be inescapable, which he attributes to Foot (2002a, 
2002b) and others, relies in part the claim that these philosophers have in 
mind a very stringent version of consequentialism. 
57 My recent work with the social psychologist Martin Bruder involves cla-
rifying some of the issues in the present context, by using the experimen-
tal methods of social psychology. 
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(2) OT turns out to be part of common sense but with exclu-
sively non-consequentialist content (such as deontic re-
strictions and special permissions). 
(3) OT turns out to be no part of common sense morality. 
Scenario (1) gives at least some ground for thinking that consequen-
tialism can incorporate OT, but at the same time makes it impossible 
to run OD. As we saw, it does not help that, given what we have es-
tablished so far, consequentialism is pervasive and has a demanding 
content at the same time. Scenario (2) allows for OD, but deprives us 
of one way of showing that consequentialism conforms to OT; hence 
we can make no progress in making OD work. Scenario (3) also al-
lows for OD and says nothing about consequentialism, neither posi-
tively, nor negatively; hence, we again make no progress towards 
OD. In sum, common-sense morality either speaks against OD, or it 
is neutral in this regard: it neither supports nor does it speak against 
the charge. 
5. Consequentialism: its reasons and their strength 
If the appeal to common-sense morality does not help, consequen-
tialists are left with the task of showing, on some other ground, that 
OT is true. This is certainly a viable route. Consequentualism, after 
all, can be right in its criticism of the alleged moderateness of com-
mon sense morality and it might also be shown that consequentialist 
directives are, against all odds, inescapable. However, this is at best 
an open ended inquiry.58 I see three ways to argue for OT. In ending 
my paper, I will show that one of these is not a viable route, whereas 
the other two have serious problems. At the same time, although I 
will highlight these difficulties, I will not argue decisively against 
these approaches. 
The first approach understands OT as the claim that consequential-
ist reasons are morally overriding.59 That is, within the moral point of 
view, consequentialist considerations reign supreme. This might be 
true, especially if consequentialism is able to incorporate or in some 
way successfully denies agent-relative aspects of morality such as 
                                           
58 Strictly speaking, anyone who wants to prove the truth of OT must justi-
fy two corollary theses: that there are reasons to act morally, and that 
there are reasons to act as consequentialism requires. In my discussion, 
however, I presuppose the truth of these claims. 
59 Kagan (1989): 66-67, Copp (1997). 
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special obligations towards our loved ones or certain deontic restric-
tions. There are several such attempts in the literature and I will not 
question their plausibility here.60 The problem with this idea lies 
elsewhere. For this approach to avoid triviality or to merely play a 
linguistic trick, it must rely on the substantial claim that a normative 
point of view from which all other points of view, including that of 
morality, may be assessed, does not exist. That is, there is no such 
thing as what one ought to do simpliciter, not from just one point of 
view: adjudication among different, moral, prudential, aesthetic etc., 
points of views is not possible. 
We may name this position normative relativism. Normative relativ-
ism is a difficult position to hold. One can point to our mor-
al/normative experience for support of the existence of unqualified 
ought judgments; one can argue that the sort of bifurcation of nor-
mativity that normative relativism supports is not plausible;61 one 
can employ an open question argument to show that the concept of 
ought simpliciter exists;62 one can show that this concept is useful for 
several philosophical tasks;63 or one can take an indirect approach 
that shows, one by one, why alleged sources of normativity do not 
in fact constitute such a source.64 The real problem with normative 
relativism, however, is that it is incompatible with OD: on this view 
we simply cannot make sense of the claim that moral reasons over-
ride non-moral reasons. For this to happen adjudication in cases of 
conflict among these reasons should be possible; yet, this is just 
what normative relativism denies. It is thus no surprise that when 
normative relativism is appealed to in discussions on OD, it is used 
to argue against the charge.65 
Normative relativism, then, cannot give us OD; but there is another 
view, which does not suffer from this shortcoming: moral rational-
ism.66 This position claims that if an agent is morally required to 
perform an act, then that agent has decisive reason to perform that 
                                           
60 Cummiskey (1996), Brand-Ballard (2004), Portmore (2001), (2003), Sen 
(2002). 
61 Cf. Sidgwick (1907): 507-508. 
62 McLeod (2001). 
63 Darwall (1990), Stroud (1998), McLeod (2001). 
64 Tännsjö (2009). 
65 Cf., for instance, Norcross (2006). 
66 See, e.g., Brink (1997), Darwall (2006), Portmore (2011a), (2011b). 
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act. That is, moral rationalism holds that the claim of overriding-
ness, in its strong form, must be true for moral requirements: re-
quirements that are not decisive, i.e. not inescapable cannot be moral 
requirements. Consequently, if moral rationalism is true, we are, it 
seems, compelled to reject consequentialism as too demanding. As 
noted in the beginning of this section, I cannot decisively argue 
against this approach. What I will do is to highlight the difficulties 
and challenges that surround it. 
First, we need a defense of moral rationalism. Recently, Douglas 
Portmore has attempted to defend moral rationalism by deriving it 
from certain theses concerning the relation between moral require-
ments, reasons to act morally, and blameworthiness.67 The argument 
is this: 
(1) If S is morally required to perform x, then S would be 
blameworthy for freely and knowledgeably performing 
~x. 
(2) S would be blameworthy for freely and knowledgeably 
~x-ing only if S does not have sufficient reason to ~x. 
(3) So, if S is morally required to perform x, then S does not 
have sufficient reason to perform ~x. 
(4) If S does not have sufficient reason to perform ~x, then S 
has decisive reason to perform x. 
(5) Therefore, if S is morally required to perform x, then S 
has decisive reason to perform x—and this is just the po-
sition of moral rationalism. 
Premise (2) is the disputable step in this argument, as Portmore ac-
knowledges, since it makes a controversial claim about blamewor-
thiness. Premise (4) is not controversial, but it does require some 
theoretical work, since it presupposes a distinction between suffi-
cient and decisive reason, which needs to be spelled out in more de-
tail.68 
                                           
67 Portmore (2011a): 131, referring to Darwall (2006) and Skorupski (1999). 
68 Portmore (2011a: 132-140) argues in length for the truth of premise (2), 
whereas premise (4) is explicated within his own framework of what it is 
for an action to be rationally required (decisive reason) and permitted 
(sufficient reason). As Portmore notes, the former explication is not con-
sistent with the silencing behaviour of reasons, thus in this respect his 
and my use of the concept of decisive reason differ. 
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Another difficulty, from the viewpoint of advocates of OD, is that 
moral rationalism might compel us to accept a version of consequen-
tialism that is immune to their challenge; in fact, Portmore uses 
moral rationalism to argue just for this thesis.69 Moral rationalism 
expresses the idea that what we are morally required to do is deter-
mined by what we have decisive reason to do. To this one can add 
the further claim that the moral status of an action is determined by 
both moral and non-moral reasons. If this is so, the way is open to 
hold that morality is limited in what it can require us to do—and 
this limitation is put on morality exactly by what we have decisive 
reason to do, and, thereby, the doctrine of moral rationalism itself. 
Naturally, this argument is controversial; but its conclusion is what 
matters to us now. For moral rationalism, understood and employed 
in this way, might not take us to OD. It seems that the (perhaps, in-
tended) effect of understanding moral rationalism along these lines 
is exactly to limit moral requirements to the extent that no deman-
dingness problem follows. If one then shows, as Portmore does, 
that, on independent grounds, moral rationalism compels us to ac-
cept some form of consequentialism, we get the final conclusion that, 
instead of rejecting consequentialism, we should endorse a limited 
version of it.70 
The last approach to prove the truth of OT is what we might call the 
old-fashioned one. We take different accounts of reasons for action, 
examine the relation that they have to consequentialism, and finally 
see the weight they attach to consequentialist considerations. 
Roughly, theories of reasons belong to either of two groups: desire-
based or value-based. I start with the desire-based account of practical 
reason.71 On this view reasons are based on the actual desires of the 
agent in some way: what we have reason to do is what satisfies 
these desires. This instrumental picture of rationality paired with a 
teleological account of action fits consequentialism well with its em-
phasis on producing as much valuable outcome as possible in the 
                                           
69 Portmore (2011b): chapter 5. 
70 Portmore’s (2011b: chapter 2) idea is that moral rationalism forces us to 
accept some version of consequentialism because of the compelling 
theory of practical reasons consequentialism involves (he calls this the 
Teleological Conception of Practical Reasons). 
71 See, e.g., Brandt (1979), Williams (1981b). 
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world. Value-based theories of reasons reject this picture.72 They 
claim instead that there are values, which are not based on desires; 
in fact, that it is these values (or the reasons they ground) that de-
sires themselves are grounded in.73 Coupled with an instrumental 
theory of rationality and a teleological account of action, moreover, 
this view too can be made to fit consequentialism. 
Theories of reasons have a troubled relationship towards claims of 
overridingness. Thus, on the desire-based reasons view, there is no a 
priori reason to believe that moral reasons would be weightier than 
non-moral ones. Theories that in one way or another base reasons 
on desires will in turn measure reasons by the strength of the de-
sire(s) they are grounded in, and this creates the problem just men-
tioned. Although one can invoke the possibility of a properly 
worked out and institutionally embedded moral psychology, even a 
suitable institutional framework may not guarantee that the relevant 
desires will be strong enough in people (cf. Rawls’ remarks on sta-
bility and consequentialism).74 
True, there is room for alteration of the original idea. Weighing, as 
Mark Schroeder has done recently, can be understood in a more 
complex way invoking a regressive account that employs lower- 
and higher-order reasons.75 But even so it will still be an open ques-
tion what this new theory of weighing brings with it with regard to 
the alleged dominance of moral reasons. To mention one possible 
line of thought, it seems that there are higher-order reasons to place 
less weight on consequentialist reasons, whereas there are higher-
order reasons to place more weight on non-moral reasons. The fact 
that the agent has already made large sacrifices (or, even, that she 
has done her fair share) may be a good candidate for the former rea-
son, whereas the fact that most of our non-moral activities are harm-
                                           
72 See, e.g., Dancy (2000), Nagel (1986), Raz (1999), Parfit (2001), Scanlon 
(1998). 
73 There is a lively debate about which is conceptually and/or metaphysi-
cally prior: reason or value. In this paper I take no sides in this contro-
versy. For a thorough treatment see Rabinowicz & Rønnow-Rassmussen 
(2004). 
74 Rawls (1971): part III. 
75 Schroeder (2007): chapter 7. 
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less or even useful and important, might be a good candidate for the 
latter reason.76 
Nor are value-based theories of reasons guaranteed to give a domi-
nant role to consequentialist reasons. There is certainly nothing in 
the idea of a reason being value-based, as opposed to desire-based, 
that would necessitate this conclusion. Furthermore, it could be ar-
gued, following Joshua Gert, that reasons, including moral reasons 
have two-values: one value represents their requiring force, the oth-
er their justifying (permitting) force.77 It could then be claimed that 
consequentialist reasons, contrary to what OD assumes, have in fact 
only justifying force and no requiring force. 
Finally, both desire-based and value-based theories encounter the 
problem of what to do with other, agent-relative aspects of morality 
(the problem being perhaps more pressing for value-based theories 
since they often independently endorse these aspects of morality). 
Since consequentialism is an agent-neutral morality it cannot really 
admit the existence of agent-relative moral reasons; it must accom-
modate or deny the existence of these reasons. Thus, the challenge 
for consequentialists is to show that agent-neutral reasons are all the 
reasons there are and agent-relative reasons are derivable from 
them. As has been noted above, there are such attempts in the litera-
ture; still, we must make note of this as being yet another challenge 
consequentialists must meet. 
6. The (very) weak case for authority 
In the preceding two sections we have browsed through the possible 
ways of establishing OT. We have seen that the appeal to common-
sense morality either does not help, or if it does, it jeopardizes the 
underlying intent to establish OD through OT. After this, we have 
considered three ways of arguing for OT. The first, invoking the po-
sition of normative relativism, we found wanting since even if the 
position could be established, it would not take us to OD. The other 
two approaches offer more hope for advocates of OD. Moral ratio-
nalism can give us OD unless it is understood in such a way that 
leads us to endorse a less demanding form of consequentialism. To 
                                           
76 Schroeder offers this line of thought in response to a criticism of his ac-
count in the discussion on the blog PEA Soup (November 20, 2008 entry). 
77 Gert (2004): chapter 5. 
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defend moral rationalism and then understand it in a way that 
avoids the above problem, however, is no easy task. The same holds 
for theories of reasons. They can give us OT, but there are many im-
pediments on the way. In sum, unless we can establish substantial 
philosophical positions that these two approaches need, we will not 
be able to defend OT. To do so, however, requires sustained philo-
sophical argumentation, which is at best an open-ended enterprise. 
Since we have earlier established that no other interpretation of OD 
is defensible, this means that our case for OD is as strong as our 
chances that these arguments will succeed: weak, if there is any at 
all. 
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